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The success of policy-based credit programs in Japan and the Republic of
Korea suggests that credit policy can be an effective instrument for economic
development. Why, then, have credit policies failed in so many countries,
and what factors explain their relative success in Japan and Korea?
Both economic and institutional factors appear to be important in the
success or failure of credit policies. Essential economic factors include a
reliance on the private sector, a bias toward industrialization, an orienta-
tion toward export production, the encouragement of domestic competi-
tion, and a commitment to price stability. Crucial institutional factors
include extensive and frequent consultation between government and the
private sector, effective monitoring systems, and, most important, a clear
and credible plan for economic development. Although several countries
have included one or more of these factors in their programs, the experi-
ence of Japan and Korea suggests that a comprehensive network combin-
ing all or most of these factors may be necessary for the successful imple-
mentation of credit policies.
Directed credit programs that give loans on preferential terms and condi-tions to priority sectors were a leading too! of development policy in the1960s and 1970s. The realization that most of these programs had cre-
ated distorted economic incentives among both lenders and borrowers led to a
reconsideration of their rationale and effectiveness during the 1980s. Countries
around the world found that the programs had stimulated projects that were
capital intensive, that preferential funds were sometimes used for nonpriority
purposes, and that the programs had increased the cost of funds to nonpreferential
borrowers. In addition, policy-based credit programs had provoked a decline in
financial discipline that led to low repayment rates and a swelling of budget
deficits. Once introduced, moreover, policy-based credit programs proved diffi-
cult to eliminate.
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This negative assessment conflicts, however, with the experience of directed
credit programs in Japan and the Republic of Korea. Government officials in
these countries argue that subsidized interest rates and government involvement
in directing credit are warranted under several circumstances: when the economy
shows a significant discrepancy between private and social benefits; when the
investment risk of particular projects is too high to attract private lenders; when
the lack of reliable economic information discourages private lending to small
and medium-size firms; and when infant industries face large social set-up costs
(OECF 1991). They suggest that the main constraint facing new or expanding
enterprises is limited access to credit at reasonable terms and conditions and
that policy-based lending and other forms of industrial assistance such as grants
and tax reduction can overcome this constraint.
Theoretical Underpinnings of Policy-Based Lending
In an ideal world in which economic information is complete and readily
available, the financial system is passive. Investors fund the projects that yield
the highest returns, and neither governments nor financial institutions need to
improve the allocation of credit. In the real world, however, information is highly
imperfect and costly to acquire, and the allocation of credit suffers from the
unequal distribution of information, the costs of monitoring and verification,
and the costs of default or contract enforcement. Under these conditions, credit
is not necessarily allocated to its best use.
Informational asymmetries give rise to the possibility that credit may be given
to unviable candidates (adverse selection), that it may be awarded to irrespon-
sible parties (moral hazard), that some players will attempt to receive, without
cost, the benefits of credit allocation (free riding), and that incentives arising
from the credit program itself may conflict with one another or with program
goals. These problems may be further compounded by uncertainty about project
returns and by dynamic externalities, which occur when external, or social, ben-
efits increase faster than do private benefits. The potential for difficulties of this
kind justifies intervention by governments and financial institutions in the allo-
cation of credit—even though their ability to allocate credit efficiently will also
be constrained by the lack of information.
Economic theory has made considerable progress in recent years in under-
standing these phenomena and has bridged the wide gap that once existed
between theory and practice (Calomiris and others 1992; Calomiris and
Himmelberg 1994, 1995; Cho and Hellmann 1994). Economic theory now
stresses, for example, the role of market imperfections in explaining why
firms rely on internally generated funds (retained earnings) and other forms
of "inside" finance (finance provided by owners, managers, and banks that
have access to information not available to the public). Reliance on inside
finance is especially pronounced for young growing firms and for new indus-
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trial sectors in developing countries, and it is clearly a factor constraining
industrial growth.
Lending by Banks
In the absence of full information, banks tend to allocate credit to firms with
reliable track records or available internal funds, even if other firms present
better investment opportunities. Financial intermediaries, especially (but not only)
commercial banks, can acquire information that is superior to that of outsiders
by developing and maintaining close long-term relationships with their custom-
ers. They can thus play an important role in screening projects, monitoring be-
havior and outcomes, and managing corporate distress.
These potential advantages of bank lending, however, depend on the behav-
ior of the bankers involved and the incentives and regulations that govern their
operations. In many countries, commercial banks favor lending for low-risk ac-
tivities, such as self-liquidating, short-term working capital and trade finance,
or for high-risk, but more speculative, projects with short payback periods, such
as real estate development. That is especially true for countries where informa-
tion on corporate performance is difficult to obtain, but it is also true for the
United Kingdom, the United States, and the Scandinavian countries, which do
not suffer from such problems. Commercial banks are generally less willing to
finance high-risk projects with long payback periods, even if these projects may
yield higher overall returns. They are generally also reluctant to finance small
firms that lack adequate collateral, even though such firms may be more inno-
vative and promising than others.
Lending by Governments
A government role in allocating credit can be justified on two grounds. First,
directed credit programs can be a preferred or superior industrial policy instru-
ment for reaping positive externalities (that is, for increasing benefits across the
economy). If firms lack access to credit, other industrial policy tools, such as
tariffs and subsidies, that may rely on cost and profit incentives to increase
production could prove ineffective.
Second, the government has a comparative advantage in directing the alloca-
tion of credit. Government agencies (often in direct collaboration with private
industrial associations and research institutes) may have better information on
sectoral prospects than do individual private firms. They may therefore have an
advantage in screening projects, as well as in monitoring behavior and outcomes—
although that will depend partly on the relative efficiency of the government
agencies and the financial intermediaries. In addition, government costs of en-
forcing contracts, through taxation and police powers, are likely to be lower
than costs for private intermediaries. The power to tax, moreover, may make it
possible for the government to internalize benefits from specific lending policies
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that private intermediaries cannot capture. This advantage increases if there are
technological spillover effects that neither the firm nor its intermediary can cap-
ture but that the government can claim through future taxes.
Ultimately, however, the advantages depend on the motivation and the effi-
ciency of the government involved. Governments do not always "do the right
thing." Government involvement in credit allocation can, and often does, result
in rent seeking by borrowers, corruption by bankers and government officials,
and crowding out of other worthwhile projects. An important issue in the study
of policy-based lending is how governments can prevent rent-seeking behavior
by borrowers from undermining the growth objectives of government policies.
Experience with directed credit policies varies widely. In Japan and Korea
government intervention in credit markets is deemed to have been effective and
beneficial for economic growth and development. In the vast majority of devel-
oping countries, however, credit policies have failed to promote growth and
have given rise, instead, to severe market distortions.
Size and Scope of Programs
Most studies of directed credit policies focus on the size of the programs, the
level of interest rates, and, especially, the level of subsidies. But focusing too
narrowly on these aspects of credit policy may be misleading. In many cases, the
government's influence on credit allocation may be much stronger than these
levels indicate. Japan, for example, avoided highly negative real interest rates
(rates adjusted for inflation) during its early period of economic development
and had relatively small (explicitly labeled) directed credit programs. The
government's role in credit allocation was nonetheless significant; in this early
period Japan combined policy-based credit with extensive financial regulation
to create a rigidly segmented financial system that favored lending to industry
but discouraged lending for speculative purposes, real estate development, or
consumption (Vittas and Kawaura 1995).
Similarly, one cannot assess the degree of government intervention in a
country over time by simply looking at the level of real interest rates. Korea,
for example, doubled the level of .interest rates in 1965, yielding highly posi-
tive real rates. Its action was interpreted by many as financial liberalization,
but the interest-rate rise actually strengthened the government's role in allo-
cating credit by shifting funds from the unregulated curb (informal) market
to the banks, which were more tightly controlled by the government (Cho
and Kim 1995).
Program Management
Just as good or bad management affects the performance of firms, good or
bad governance affects the success of credit policies. Although economists have
recognized some merit to government intervention in specific markets, they have
280 The World Bank Research Observer, vol. 11, no. 2 (August 1996)
often equated failures in these markets with a simplistic notion of government
failure. Precisely what characteristics contribute to good economic management
and good policy implementation?
Good management, even for an economy, does not always mean the least
management or least intervention. It does, however, require effective incentive
schemes to motivate behavior beneficial to the economy; it also requires a sup-
portive institutional environment, an arrangement for close consultation and
coordination between the government and business sector, and effective mecha-
nisms for monitoring and enforcing performance. Government control of credit
may also be understood in light of governance structures. Indeed, credit alloca-
tion was used_as a powerful instrument for governance of industrial firms in
Korea and, to a lesser extent, in Japan (Cho and Hellmann 1994; Vittas and
Kawaura 1995).
Government's role in credit policy should also be understood in a dynamic
context. In the early stages of economic development, when many markets
are missing, when those that exist are highly imperfect, and when private
institutions are poorly developed, government intervention can help stimu-
late healthy economic growth. In the later stages of development, when the
private industrial sector has become more sophisticated and markets are better
developed and more robust, the merits of government intervention diminish
significantly.
Credit Supports or Grants?
Assuming that the government is able to identify and confront the prob-
lems arising from market imperfections, why should it use credit supports
(preferential access to credit or subsidized interest rates) rather than grants
(direct outlays through the government budget) to address these problems?
The answer relates to both efficiency and flexibility. In disbursing grants,
the government must select the individual firms that deserve support. In dis-
bursing credit subsidies, the government need only signal the sectors that
deserve support and leave the selection of individual firms to the banks. In
addition, directed credit as an instrument of industrial policy depends partly
on the timing of the subsidy, not simply the amount. Subsidies may be allo-
cated more flexibly than grants, and they may take into account the perfor-
mance of subsidized firms or industries. Good performance can be rewarded
by rolling over debt or extending new debt; bad performance (including the
diversion of funds to nonpriority uses) can be punished by reducing or termi-
nating support. In addition, it is not clear, despite claims to the contrary,
that budgetary outlays are more open to scrutiny than are credit subsidies.
Both kinds of support risk politicization. In a country where individual credit
allocations are based on economic criteria, operating through credit subsi-
dies may be both less politicized and more flexible than operating through
the budget.
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Credit Policy in Japan
Japanese credit and industrial policy has evolved in response to the changing
needs and structure of Japan's economy (Vittas and Wang 1991; JDB/JERI1994;
Vittas and Kawaura 1995). Three phases are usually identified: the reconstruc-
tion period, from 1945 to 1955, when industrial policy and the direct govern-
ment allocation of funds were most significant; the high-growth period, from
1955 to 1973, when government policy operated less directly, although the fi-
nancial system was rigidly segmented and subject to wide-ranging controls; and
the liberalization period, from the mid-1970s to the present, when policy be-
came less interventionist, and a slow but steady process of financial liberaliza-
tion began.
Japan's early emphasis on individual industries has given way to a recent
concentration on programs that cross industrial boundaries. The main focus of
industrial policy in the 1950s was the expansion of capacity, followed in the
1960s by modernization and technological upgrading, in the 1970s by restruc-
turing and adjustment at both the company and industry levels, and in the 1980s
by diversification of the industrial structure. Throughout, Japanese credit (and
industrial) policy seems to have had four specific industrial objectives: to pick
and support "winning" industries, especially in markets in which Japan could
enjoy a dynamic comparative advantage; to phase out industries in which Japan
was no longer internationally competitive; to support small firms; and to pro-
vide the industrial infrastructure necessary for growth.
The extensive financial support given some traditional and relatively ineffi-
cient industries, such as agriculture, can be seen more as a social policy objec-
tive, or a response to political pressures, than as a component of an active indus-
trial policy. Government regulation and intervention in the financial sector did
not focus exclusively on securing cheap finance for the most dynamic sectors,
but instead seemed to aim for a balance among the claims of different sectors.
Basic Features
During the high-growth era, several features of the Japanese financial system,
although not unique in themselves, combined to produce a system quite distinct
from Anglo-American or European financial systems. These features included
the preponderant use of indirect finance; the reliance of the large city banks on
credits from the Bank of Japan to fund their loans to industrial corporations; the
overborrowing, or high leverage, of industrial companies; and the artificially
low level of interest rates (Suzuki 1980; but see Kuroda and Oritani 1980,
Horiuchi 1984, and Ikeo 1987, who challenge the particularity of these charac-
teristics). Other distinctive features of the Japanese financial system include the
role played by the main bank system (in which certain banks were not only main
lenders to specific companies but also the main shareholders and providers of
other financial services), the close relations between banks and industry, the
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different roles played by debt and equity in the Japanese financial system, and
the important financial intermediary role played by large conglomerate groups,
especially the general trading companies, in channeling funds to small firms at
the periphery of different industrial groups. Because the financial sector in Ja-
pan was highly segmented during this period, the government had considerable
control over the allocation of financial resources. The Japanese authorities did
not, however, impose strict directed credit programs on private financial insti-
tutions.
The most distinctive element of Japan's industrial policy has been the coop-
erative relationship between government and industry, each of which has recog-
nized the necessity of striving toward common goals. This cooperation has been
reflected most clearly in the emergence of the "deliberative council system," by
which councils made up of industry representatives, former bureaucrats, aca-
demics, and others have provided the public and private sectors with a forum for
coordinating and developing policy directives. These councils were well estab-
lished by the 1960s, when they decided almost all important industrial policies.
Another important aspect of Japan's directed credit programs has been the
high quality of loan appraisal and project oversight. Loan approval is based on
detailed reviews of the projects to be financed and evaluations of the history and
character of the firms involved. Once projects are approved, no payments are
made without adequate documentation. Close cooperation between develop-
ment and commercial banks then ensures continuous monitoring of the perfor-
mance of borrowers and allows development banks to take early action if loan
repayments are in arrears. The general economic success of Japan has also meant
that most borrowers have made substantial profits and have had little difficulty
in repaying their loans.
Three general characteristics of Japanese credit policy seem particularly sig-
nificant in accounting for its success. The first is the Japanese government's
respect for the market economy. A precondition for a successful policy-based
financial system is the existence of private business and financial structures that
can be supplemented with policy-based funding. Japan's prewar experience as a
market economy and its determination to establish postwar economic reform
created an environment that encouraged entrepreneurship within the existing
private sector.
The second characteristic (particularly evident as Japan's high-growth period
unfolded) is the close relation between policy-based finance and the government's
economic plans. The preconditions for this relationship are a public savings sys-
tem (in Japan, the postal savings system) and a vehicle for the efficient alloca-
tion of funds (in Japan, the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program).
The third characteristic has been the Japanese government's respect for mana-
gerial independence, assuming the existence of a sound financial institution and
management. Although the Japan Development Bank has had inherent limita-
tions as a government-related financial institution, it has the autonomy to make
funding decisions on a neutral and fair appraisal basis.
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The Reconstruction Finance Bank and the Dodge Flan
The Japanese government established several agencies to assist in the distri-
bution of policy-based funds. The first of these was the Reconstruction Finance
Bank, which was created immediately after the war to provide finance to prior-
ity industries. It accounted for 84 percent of the total funding for capital invest-
ment during the postwar period and for 16 percent of the working capital needs
of major industries such as coal, electric power, fertilizers, iron and steel, ocean
shipping, and textiles. This financing facilitated the recovery of production of
these high-priority industries and paved the way for Japan's economic recovery.
The Reconstruction Finance Bank was funded, however, by bonds underwrit-
ten by the Bank of Japan, a strategy that fueled inflation, which in turn made the
fixed interest rates on priority loans highly negative. The loss of control over
inflation, combined with a high incidence of delinquent loans (as well as finan-
cial scandal at the reconstruction bank), led the Japanese authorities to suspend
the bank's operations in 1949, at which time the Dodge Plan for economic sta-
bilization was introduced.
The Dodge Plan was intended to achieve a central government surplus and a
unified and stable exchange rate. The plan initially caused a deep economic
recession, with reductions in exports and investment, company closures, and
production and personnel cuts. Successful implementation of the Dodge Plan,
however, imposed fiscal balance, removed price controls, and contained mon-
etary expansion. Although the policy brought about deflation, it created the
stable macroeconomic environment necessary for the subsequent implementa-
tion of policy-based lending and other industrial policies leading to the rational-
ization and modernization of Japanese industry.
Other Directed Credit Institutions
In the early 1950s the Japanese authorities established several policy-based
financial institutions to provide funding for industrial investment, housing de-
velopment, and other purposes.
THE FISCAL INVESTMENT AND LOAN PROGRAM. TO avoid the inflationary impli-
cations of financing these activities through monetary creation, these institu-
tions were funded with resources collected through the extensive postal savings
and annuities network and channeled through the Trust Fund Bureau as part of
the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program. The funds available to the program
amounted to 4 percent of gross national product in the 1950s and increased to
more than 8 percent in the early 1990s. This increase reflects the growing im-
portance of the postal savings funds. Policy-based finance through the trust fund
accounted for 13 percent of total lending in the mid-1950s, fell to 10 percent in
the 1960s, rose to 15 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, and declined to 12 percent
in the early 1990s.
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The funds have increasingly been used over the years for social (or, at least,
nonindustrial) purposes, especially for financing housing development. The trust
fund's share of the total supply of funds for new industrial equipment fell from
about 30 percent in the mid-1950s, to 20 percent for most of the following two
decades, to about 12 percent in recent years.
The most favorable interest rate offered by policy-based financial institutions
at the beginning of the 1950s was 3.5 percentage points lower than the private
sector long-term prime rate; the least favorable was the same as the prime rate.
In addition, policy-based loans had much longer maturities (up to twelve years)
and did not require the compensating balances that often substantially increased
the cost of private finance, especially for smaller firms. Although policy-based
loans continued at fixed rates of interest after the 1950s, success in maintaining
macroeconomic and price stability avoided the recurrence of the highly negative
interest rates that had bedeviled the reconstruction bank's early operations.
THE JAPAN DEVELOPMENT BANK. The successor, in a sense, to the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Bank, the Japan Development Bank was given a managerial inde-
pendence the first bank had never had. The government assured the first gover-
nor of the Japan Development Bank that he would not have to bend to political
pressure to fund nonviable projects and that loan decisions would be left to the
professional judgment of bank staff and officials. The government was respon-
sible for annually establishing the basic policy for the operation of funds and for
conducting regular annual audits. The bank allocated project funds, monitored
their spending, and assessed their impact. This system of multiple checks pre-
vented the misuse of policy-based funds and enabled the development bank to
keep its loan losses low.
The Japan Development Bank made relatively few mistakes in selecting loan
projects. Despite its specialization in long-term industrial finance, the bank's
loan losses during the high-growth era were much lower than those of the com-
mercial and trust banks, which concentrated on short-term loans and more di-
versified loan portfolios. The bank experienced write-offs of 0.09 percent of
average loans outstanding from 1951 to 1955 and of only 0.01 percent from
1956 to 1965. One caveat should be noted, however. Some of the loan losses
incurred in declining industrial sectors, such as coal mining and, later, ship-
building, were transferred to the Japanese government and absorbed by the gen-
eral budget. This may explain the unusually low level of loan losses for the
period, not only by the development bank, but also by most commercial banks.
When the development bank was established, the equity capital contribution
from the government accounted for a substantial portion of its total funds. Be-
cause statutory reserves increased in proportion to increases in its loan balance,
the bank's financial composition continued to be favorable. It could therefore
offer a preferential interest rate in line with policy demands, without being sub-
sidized by public finance. This strong financial position further guaranteed its
managerial autonomy.
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Empirical Evaluation
Two recent empirical studies lend support to the argument that policy-based
finance in Japan was effective in stimulating initial growth and encouraging
private investment in growing firms in priority industries. Horiuchi and Sui (1993)
compared the investment behavior of medium-size firms receiving development
bank assistance for the 1964-88 period with firms of similar size not receiving
such funding. They found that the year of initial lending was associated with
increased private investment and that within three years, firms began to move
away from dependence on development bank lending to rely more on private
banks. Horiuchi and Sui also found that directed credit was most effective for
firms that did not have main bank affiliations.
Calomiris and Himmelberg (1995) examined the effect of policy-based fi-
nance for 1963-91 for the machine tool industry, an industry selected for its
high potential for spillover effects through technological innovation and learn-
ing. The authors based their study on data for firms, collected with the support
of the Japan Development Bank. Because the data set excludes firms that closed
during the period, identifying positive effects from policy-based finance is some-
what difficult, particularly for the 1960s and 1970s, when machine tool produc-
ers underwent considerable consolidation and less-productive firms shut down
or were merged with other firms.
The level of credit sought by machine tool producers declined over the con-
solidation period. It averaged 27 percent of capital from 1965 to 1974 but fell to
10 percent from 1975 to 1991. Similarly, total long-term debt for these produc-
ers fell in relation to capital, from 41 percent before 1975 to 26 percent after-
ward. Directed credit, which accounted for only a small part of total long-term
credit for this period, fell from an average of 3 percent of capital before 1978 to
1 percent after the mid-1980s, or from more than 7 percent of all long-term
credit to less than 4 percent.
A comparison of lending to general machinery producers by the Japan Devel-
opment Bank, by private long-term lenders, and by the government-affiliated
Export Import Bank of Japan provides interesting insights. Development bank
lending declined, from between 3.7 and 5.3 percent of capital in the late 1960s
to between 0.8 and 2.6 percent in the 1980s. This clear drop in support is consis-
tent with the premise that government credit relaxed borrowing constraints and
helped firms to become seasoned credit risks. Credit from the private Industrial
Bank of Japan ranged from between 5.8 and 8.9 percent of capital in the late
1960s to between 4.0 and 6.6 percent in the 1980s. Thus, despite the growing
recourse of Japanese firms to the Euromarkets in the 1980s, their reliance on
private Japanese funding did not experience the same decline as their use of
credit from the development bank.
In contrast to borrowing from the development bank, borrowing from the
export-import bank registered a large increase, from between 0.4 and 0.9 per-
cent of capital in the 1960s to between 3.8 and 19.9 percent in the 1980s. The
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growing reliance on these loans must be associated with the increasing maturity
of the industry and the greater part played by exports, and perhaps overseas
operations, in the 1980s. Support from government sources thus showed con-
siderable flexibility in responding to changes in the structure and orientation of
the industries and firms receiving credit support. Similar patterns are observed
for other types of machine tool producers.
Calomiris and Himmelberg also found that government funds had not been
captured at either the industry level or firm level. Directed credit was usually
provided to a firm only once and for a brief period (80 percent of firms received
one-time credit for an average period of less than eight years). They also found
that government credit was provided to large, growing, capital-intensive firms
with high investment rates. Directed credit appears to have bolstered the posi-
tive characteristics of these firms, reinforcing the process of consolidation, in-
vestment, and technological change desired by the government. The authors
also found that government credit was positively correlated not only with pri-
vate credit, but also with reinvestment by the firms themselves. These results are
weaker than those Calomiris and Himmelberg reported in 1994 for a shorter
period (1982 to 1991). The authors' use of a different methodology in conduct-
ing the empirical tests seems to be the main reason for the weaker results re-
ported in 1995. Another reason may be a selection bias in the sample used for
the 1963-91 period, which did not include firms that closed in the 1960s and
1970s. If those firms were low-investment, poor-performance firms and those
that survived were the ones more likely to have received government credit, the
effect of government credit would be underestimated. In addition, accounting
data for the earlier years are probably less reliable.
For the nearly thirty-year sample period studied by Calomiris and Himmelberg,
a government loan of 100 yen produced an average investment of 60 yen. The
effect of credit from the Japan Development Bank was even stronger: a 100 yen
loan produced a 150 yen investment as well as 44 yen in long-term loans from
private sources. During the 1960s credit from several government agencies shared
equal responsibility for the overall effect of government credit; during the 1970s
and 1980s, credit from the development bank had the largest and most signifi-
cant impact. A possible explanation for this difference may be that other gov-
ernment lenders moved away from producers with high growth potential in the
1970s and 1980s.
Credit Policy in Korea
Credit policy in Korea has also experienced three distinct phases. In the 1950s
and 1960s it was directed toward particular activities, mainly exports and in-
dustrial investment. In the 1970s it increasingly promoted specific industries, in
particular, the heavy and chemical industries. The successes and failures of this
phase induced a change in strategy, and in the 1980s the government became
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involved in the industrial and financial restructuring of sectors and companies
in distress. As in Japan, Korean credit (and industrial) policy began to focus not
only on picking winners, but also on phasing out losers. At the same time, policy
was reoriented toward producing a more balanced industrial sector that would
not be dominated by a few business conglomerates. Lending to small and me-
dium-sized firms received greater attention than it had in the earlier stages, and
credit policy was redirected toward functional activities such as research and
development and investment in equipment.
Basic Features
Credit policy in Korea differed from that in Japan in several important re-
spects. It involved significant government subsidization of the cost of borrow-
ing, and the scope of directed credit programs was much broader. The Korean
program made extensive use of commercial as well as development banks to
channel loans to priority sectors; the government owned both types of banks.
Government intervention in Korean credit policy was also somewhat coercive.
The government used a strong package of tax and financial incentives to en-
courage firms with minimum equity funds to enter priority industries, and it
used its control of the banking system to exert strong leverage on the behavior
of firms (World Bank 1987; Cho 1989; Vittas and Wang 1991; Cho and Kim
1995).
In the 1950s credit policies were often implemented without clear industrial
policy goals. In the 1960s, however, they were structured specifically to support
exports and were linked more closely with other policy measures.
The Korean government undertook a series of measures in the early 1960s to
strengthen state control over finance. It nationalized the commercial banks and
amended the central bank act to subordinate the Bank of Korea to the govern-
ment. In 1965 it implemented interest rate reform, doubling the level of bank
interest rates. This reform not only prompted the rapid growth of deposits in the
government-controlled banks, but also expanded the scope of government con-
trol over the allocation of financial resources, as funds shifted from the infor-
mal, unregulated market to the regulated sector.
In addition, the government initiated close consultations with the business
sector during the 1960s and careful monitoring of the performance of sup-
ported firms. The Monthly Export Promotion Meetings and Monthly Brief-
ings on Economic Trends, which were chaired by the Korean president and
included senior government officials, managers of industrial firms, bankers,
and representatives of industry associations, constituted a forum both among
ministries and between the government and the private sector. In these meet-
ings, progress toward achieving policy goals was closely reviewed and a con-
sensus sought on ways to address emerging problems. The economic man-
agement of Korean industry thus came to resemble that of a major
corporation. The banks were used as the treasury unit; the industrial sector,
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as the production and marketing units; and the government, as the central
planning and control unit.
During the 1970s the government relied heavily on its control of the credit
system, particularly policy-based loans to provide the heavy and chemical in-
dustries with preferential access to credit at substantially subsidized rates. The
authorities had intended to reduce policy interventions in the credit market in
the 1980s, but overexpansion of the heavy and chemical industries in the late
1970s, coupled with the collapse of foreign markets in construction, shipping,
and shipbuilding in the early 1980s, forced the government to assist in restruc-
turing industrial firms that faced financial difficulties. As Korean politics be-
came more democratized in the late 1980s, the emphasis of directed credit pro-
grams was shifted to social programs and income redistribution.
SOURCES OF FUNDS. A significant difference in the selective credit policies of
Korea and Japan has been in the source of funds used for policy loans. Korea has
depended heavily on central bank credit and on deposits mobilized by commer-
cial banks, and much less than Japan has on fiscal funds or funds mobilized
through the government, such as postal savings. In Korea only 7 to 8 percent of
the total value of policy loans extended by commercial banks were financed by
fiscal funds; about 35 percent were financed through central bank credit at a
discounted rate. Korea's heavy reliance on money creation to finance policy-
based loans may in large part explain why prices in Korea have been less stable
than in Japan.
Unlike Japan, Korea used foreign capital as a major source of policy-based
finance. Foreign capital had a particularly strong effect on Korean economic
development, moreover, because domestic savings were far below desired in-
vestment levels. Many observers overlook the role of foreign capital in shaping
Korean economic policies (including financial sector policies) and the course of
development in Korea. Between 1962 and 1982, the average annual economic
growth rate was 8.2 percent. A rough estimate suggests that if investment had
depended entirely on domestic savings during this period, the average growth
rate would have been only 4.9 percent. Without ready access to foreign capital,
Korea could not have continued the repressive financial policies that appear to
have accelerated economic growth—although these policies also limited the
mobilization of financial resources.
The Korean government controlled foreign loan allocation as tightly as it
regulated domestic credit. All foreign loans required government authorization,
and their allocation was determined by industrial policy goals. In 1965 the gov-
ernment revised the Foreign Capital Inducement Act to allow government-con-
trolled banks to guarantee the repayment of foreign borrowing by firms. These
guarantees encouraged inflows of foreign capital and technology, but they also
perpetuated government intervention in the banks. To avoid default on foreign
loans and possible profound disruptions in development projects, the banks of-
ten had to absorb, through the rescheduling of domestic bank loans, the exter-
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nal shocks that prevented domestic firms from meeting their foreign debt ser-
vice. The cost of government intervention in domestic banks had, in turn, to be
shared by the banks' depositors.
THE SHARE AND STRUCTURE OF POLICY LOANS. Policy loans mobilized by the
Korean financial system were substantial, accounting for about 50 percent of the
total credit extended by domestic financial institutions in the 1970s. That pro-
portion gradually decreased to about 30 percent as private nonbank financial
institutions, which were not required to make policy-based loans, expanded their
share in the 1980s. Policy loans accounted for about 60 percent of total lending
made by government-controlled deposit money banks throughout the period.
In the 1960s and 1970s, policy loans were extended mainly to the manufac-
turing sector; its share of total bank credit was more than twice its share of gross
domestic product (GDP), whereas the service sector's share was only about 60
percent of its share in GDP.1 Within the manufacturing sector, export industries
and the heavy and chemical industries received more credit in relation to their
share in GDP than did light industries or industries producing for domestic
consumption.
Policy Effectiveness
Available data suggest that Korean credit policies were effective in reducing
the cost of funds to priority sectors and in enhancing their access to funds. Ex-
port-oriented firms enjoyed greater access to credit and lower borrowing costs
than did domestic-oriented firms. Heavy and chemical industries, despite their
high risk of failure, had greater access to credit and significantly lower borrow-
ing costs than did light manufacturing industries. The availability and low cost
of funds aided in the rapid expansion of the export and heavy and chemical
industry sectors, especially in the initial, take-off stage.
This evidence does not necessarily imply, however, that selective credit sup-
ports were essential for rapid economic growth. The opportunity cost of such
supports, that is, the cost of benefits lost by choices not made, are very difficult
to estimate. A general equilibrium analysis might provide some answers, but in
Korea such an analysis would face severe limitations because substantial parts
of input and output prices were controlled in the early stages of development. It
is too early, in any case, to provide a full answer to this question. Korean eco-
nomic development is still in progress, and the cost of past financial policies
may not have been fully realized.
It seems clear that export growth drove economic growth in Korea in the
1960s and 1970s and that credit support was indispensable for export growth.
Thus credit support must have contributed to rapid economic growth (although
a large subsidy may not have been necessary to trigger export growth). The
effect of credit supports on growth of the heavy and chemical industries remains
controversial, however. Although credit supports contributed to the rapid de-
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velopment of the two industries, credit might have been used more efficiently,
given the labor endowment in the 1970s, if its allocation had been better bal-
anced between the heavy and chemical industries and light industry. It can also
be argued, however, that had the push to develop the heavy and chemical indus-
tries not taken place in the 1970s, and the two sectors not become Korea's
leading export industries in the mid-1980s, Korea might not have been able to
take full advantage of the appreciation of the Japanese yen and the world eco-
nomic boom in the second half of the 1980s. No solid answer can be provided to
this question.
The impact of credit policies on industrialization is not limited to their effect
on the cost of and access to credit. In an economy like Korea's, in which initial
capital accumulation was low, and rapid investment growth was financed mainly
by bank credits and foreign loans, firms were highly leveraged financially. As a
result, any significant economic downturn would precipitate a financial crisis
unless schemes existed for sharing risk between creditors and borrowers. By
controlling finance, the Korean government became an effective risk-sharing
partner with the industrialists. It could thus encourage their venturesomeness
and induce them to have long-term horizons for their companies. The govern-
ment was thus a partner, with industry and the banks, in an implicit coinsurance
scheme. Without this partnership, Korea might not have been able to establish
its large, internationally competitive industrial firms so quickly. This indirect
effect of the government's credit policies may be more important than the sub-
sidies themselves in explaining Korea's rapid industrialization.
The Cost and Legacy of Credit Policies
Government control of finance in Korea was not without cost. Several com-
mentators have argued that the drive to develop the heavy and chemical indus-
tries was overambitious and resulted in a serious misallocation of resources.
These critics maintain that the priority sectors expanded production capacity
too rapidly, giving firms too little time to accumulate experience and digest new
technologies. The result, critics say, was that most firms experienced excess
capacity, high production costs, and products so low in quality that they could
not be exported. At the same time, nonpriority sectors were forced to borrow at
very high rates from the informal sector. This dual nature of the credit system
created a major imbalance in the industrial structure of the country (Koo 1984;
Kwack 1984).
Because Korea relied too heavily and for too long on credit interventions as
an instrument of industrial policy, the costs were borne primarily by banks and
their depositors. Commercial banks in Korea were involved so deeply in di-
rected credit programs that they functioned as development banks. Managerial
efficiency and quality of services were compromised, and the banks had large
volumes of nonperforming loans. Nonbank financial institutions, which oper-
ated more freely, expanded rapidly and superseded the banks' share in the fi-
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nancial intermediation market. The expansion of the nonbanks helped to im-
prove financial market operations by keeping competitive forces alive in the
financial system.
The problem of carelessness and irresponsibility at the commercial banks was
no less serious. As long as the government was willing to rescue firms, banks
had little incentive to screen projects carefully or to monitor firms' performance.
Indeed, the firms supported by the government became too large and dominant
to be allowed to go bankrupt. In the mid-1980s when export markets collapsed
after the second oil shock and the worldwide recession, considerable financial
support was given to ailing firms and industrial sectors. Although detailed data
for this period are not readily available, these setbacks apparently made it in-
creasingly difficult for the government to break out of a pattern of financial
repression. When the subsequent expansion of the Korean economy and the
increasing sophistication of its industrial structure called for a more innovative
and market-oriented financial sector, this past legacy became a constraint on
liberalization.
Because Korea's industrial policy emphasized the economies of large-scale pro-
duction to maintain international competitiveness, it led to overwhelming economic
concentration within huge business conglomerates, known as chaebols. During the
1970s, it was not uncommon for these conglomerates to triple the number of their
affiliates through new acquisitions. In the 1980s, in the face of growing public dis-
content with excessive economic concentration, the government was forced to redi-
rect policies toward redistributing income; this change in focus often involved in-
creased regulation of the business activities of the large firms.
Factors of Success in Japan and Korea
Theory and practical experience in Japan and Korea suggest that credit policy
can be an effective policy instrument for economic development. Why, then, did
credit policies fail in so many countries, and what factors explain their relative
success in Japan and Korea?
The presence of specific economic and institutional factors seem to be essen-
tial to success. Economic factors include the maintenance of price stability, an
orientation toward export production, the encouragement of domestic competi-
tion, a reliance on the private sector, and a bias toward industrialization. Insti-
tutional factors include the use of extensive public-private consultative arrange-
ments, the creation of effective monitoring systems, and, above all, the
development and propagation of credible visions.
Price Stability
Japan and Korea have, with occasional exceptions, both been able to main-
tain price stability. Price stability in itself, however, does not seem sufficient to
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ensure the success of credit policies. Several countries in the Middle East, North
Africa, South Asia, and southern Europe have also avoided high inflation rates.
India, for example, has maintained better price stability than has Korea, but
neither India's credit policies nor its economic performance have been as suc-
cessful as Japan's or Korea's. Price stability seems clearly to be important for
encouraging the growth of financial savings. India and other countries with
moderate inflation have experienced a substantial deepening of their financial
sectors compared with countries with similar levels of per capita income but
with higher inflation. Japan, with very stable prices, has experienced steady and
rapid growth of its financial system. Korea, however, with relatively high infla-
tion, experienced poor growth of its financial sector in the 1970s, although that
trend was reversed in the 1980s. The recent rapid growth of financial saving in
China, where the macroeconomic environment has been relatively stable com-
pared with other developing countries, also supports the importance of price
stability.
Competition, Exports, and Private Ownership
The credit policies of Japan and Korea have been more successful than other
countries primarily because those two countries were able to combine price sta-
bility with intense domestic competition, strong export orientation, and a sig-
nificant reliance on the private sector. A strong orientation toward exports has
forced domestic firms in Japan and Korea to attain high levels of efficiency in
order to compete internationally. It has also provided objective criteria for moni-
toring the performance of individual firms and for assessing the effectiveness of
credit supports. Good performance in export markets, for example, implies con-
tinuing access to policy-based finance.
Although both Japan and Korea have had import protection, the large indus-
trial firms have engaged in vigorous competition in their respective domestic
markets. Even in the economically stable countries of the Middle East, South
Asia, and southern Europe, industrial production has often been sheltered from
both domestic and foreign competition, has been directed toward domestic con-
sumption, and has been controlled by state-owned enterprises.
Industrialization and Export Promotion
Credit policies in Japan and Korea have been narrowly focused and well co-
ordinated with other policies. Policy measures, such as those dealing with for-
eign exchange, tax, and fiscal arrangements, have been directed toward sup-
porting industrialization and export promotion, the main objective of credit
policies. The allocation of foreign exchange in Japan and the approval of foreign
loans in Korea have been coordinated with domestic credit policies to advance
industrial strategy. Credit policies in India, by contrast, have focused on redis-
tributing wealth and income toward small farmers and firms and have thus off-
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set other programs supporting manufacturing and exports. These conflicting
policies have often resulted in an implicit taxation of large industries to support
farmers and small business.
Consultation with the Private Sector
Government participation and leadership in organizations such as the delib-
erative councils in Japan and the industrial associations in Korea have been
critical in helping these countries avoid the pitfalls of credit policy. The coop-
erative networks they have established have helped to ensure that scarce re-
sources are allocated to activities likely to yield long-term benefits across the
economy, and they have provided an effective mechanism for collective risk-
sharing by industry, government, and their lenders. Monthly meetings have of-
fered opportunities to collect and exchange information, to reassure individual
firms and lenders of the government's commitment to particular enterprises,
and to promote consensus in pursuit of industrial policy goals. Organizations
such as these, however, may be subject to manipulation, corruption, and ineffi-
ciency. Their use in allocating credit is an improvement over market solutions
only if there are strong safeguards against abuse.
Monitoring
Reference has already been made to the effectiveness of monitoring in Japan
and Korea. Loan approval in Japan is preceded by careful review and indepen-
dent appraisal, and the use of funds is strictly monitored. Fund disbursement is
based on adequate documentation, and continued access to policy-based loans
depends on success in reaching objective targets, mostly in internationally com-
petitive export markets.
The importance of effective monitoring cannot be overemphasized. What
matters for economic development is not really the mobilization and allocation
of financial resources but the efficient use of those resources. Any country can
mobilize resources by printing money, which it can then allocate to priority
sectors. Such money creation will, of course, increase inflationary pressures, but
if the resources are used well and lead to higher and more efficient levels of
production, unit costs will be lowered and will offset the inflationary impact of
the initial monetary financing.
Vision
Although economists have generally paid little attention to the broad aspects
of strategy, the importance of having a credible and consistent vision for eco-
nomic development cannot be overstated. In both Japan and Korea, industrial-
ization and economic growth have taken precedence over the development of an
efficient and modern financial sector. Although the authorities have been com-
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mitted to ensuring the safety of deposits and the solvency of financial intermedi-
aries, they have been less concerned with allowing banks and other financial
intermediaries to innovate and develop new services intended to reduce the cost
of financial intermediation. Banks in both countries have been subject to exten-
sive controls—on bank spreads and interest rates, branching and bank mergers,
and bond issues—as well as to administrative guidance that initially discour-
aged lending for consumer credit and housing finance and encouraged the cre-
ation of large industrial-financial groupings. In addition, both countries have
encouraged lending to fast-growing, high-yield industries, such as automobiles,
electronics, petrochemicals, and steel, in which income elasticity of demand has
been high, technological progress has been rapid, and labor productivity has
risen quickly. Their strategies have emphasized dynamic comparative advan-
tage rather than static cost considerations (Ojimi 1972; Johnson 1982; Yotopoulos
1991).
It is ironic that the current sorry state of Japanese banks derives from bad
loans made after credit policies were relaxed in the 1980s and real estate lending
was expanded exponentially. The lesson to draw from the current experience of
Japanese banks, however, is not that liberalization was ill advised. Japan's in-
dustrial success made inevitable a reorientation of its financial system toward
real estate lending, housing finance, and consumer credit. What hurt the banks
was the failure to recognize accumulating problem loans and to take early mea-
sures to address the impact of that buildup on the banking system.
Several other aspects of broad strategy have contributed to the success of
credit policies in Japan and Korea. Both countries, for example, have empha-
sized complementarities in production for exports and domestic sales. This tac-
tic has allowed resources to shift to exports when balance of payments problems
forced the government to curtail domestic demand and to shift back to domestic
sales when the problems of paying for imported raw materials have eased. The
rationale is that if factories can operate through all phases of the business cycle,
they can achieve higher scales of production and lower operating costs (Johnson
1982; Yotopoulos 1991).
Japan has benefited from an industrial strategy that has been adjusted over
time to meet the needs of general development goals. This flexibility of focus
has allowed Japan to emphasize, first, the recovery of priority production, then
the modernization of equipment in heavy industries, and, later, the development
of new industrial sectors, such as machine tools, with a high potential for pro-
ducing positive economic side effects. The strategy has also accommodated the
smooth adjustment of declining industries, the restructuring of companies fac-
ing difficulties, and the rationalization of entire sectors of industry suffering
from overcapacity.
Credit policies in Japan and Korea have also emphasized the use of additional
instruments of industrial policy to complement policy-based finance. Both coun-
tries have made extensive use of incentives such as accelerated depreciation al-
lowances and tax-free special reserves. These incentives have permitted success-
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ful firms in targeted sectors to retain and reinvest a larger part of their profits
than firms in nontargeted sectors have been allowed to retain. Particularly im-
portant have been the special reserves that are tied to past export performance,
because these are linked with the overall strategy of export promotion. These
incentives have reinforced the impact of credit policies and have accentuated
the credibility of directed credit programs.
The existence of coherent, credible visions for development in Japan and Korea
has also lent substance to the consultative process. Many countries have tried to
promote close consultation between government and the private sector, but with-
out a clear vision for development, such exchanges have been little more than
ineffective talk shops or forums for special pleading. An important contribution
to this collaboration in Japan and Korea was the governments' collection and
dissemination of information about long-term sectoral prospects, an activity
not readily undertaken by the private industrial sector or the private securities
markets. A clear vision of economic goals supported by the analysis of broadly
reliable data about the prospects of particular industrial sectors reinforced the
economic signaling effect of policy-based finance in Japan and Korea.
Lessons from Japan and Korea
Ten general lessons can be drawn from the experiences of Japan and Korea.
The first six relate to "good vision," the last four to "good management." First,
credit programs must be small in size, have a narrow focus, and be of limited
duration with clear phase-out provisions. Second, programs must involve a low
level of subsidy (if any), to minimize incentives to profit from price fluctuations
and also to reduce the tax on financial intermediation that all credit programs
necessarily entail. Third, programs must be financed by long-term funds to avoid
inflation. Recourse to central bank credit, in particular, should be avoided ex-
cept in the very early stage of development, when selective credit programs sup-
ported by central bank credit might help jump-start economic growth and de-
velopment. Even at this stage, however, care must be taken to prevent high rates
of inflation. Fourth, programs should aim at achieving positive economic or
social side effects (or at avoiding negative effects). They should therefore focus
on overcoming the external finance constraint facing small or rapidly expanding
firms as well as helping firms in declining industries to phase out in an orderly
and timely fashion. Fifth, programs should promote industrialization and ex-
port orientation, and they should be based on a competitive private sector with
internationally competitive operations. Sixth, programs should form part of a
broader credible vision of economic development, promoting growth with eq-
uity and including a long-term strategy to develop a sound financial system
operating on economic criteria.
Seventh, policy-based loans should be channeled through well-capitalized,
administratively capable, and autonomous financial institutions. Professional
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management and managerial autonomy are essential. Eighth, loans should be
based on clear, objective criteria that are easily monitored. Detailed project ap-
praisals, close supervision of disbursements, and monitoring of performance and
repayment records are essential to the success of credit programs. Ninth, policy-
based programs should aim for a good repayment record and low loan losses.
Tenth, programs should be supported by effective mechanisms for consultation
between the public and private sectors, including the collection and dissemina-
tion of basic market information.
Although these lessons are important, replicating the Japanese and Korean
experience may be difficult in today's financial environment. High technology
coupled with the globalization of financial markets has substantially reduced the
effectiveness of foreign exchange controls on capital movements and has limited
the ability of government authorities to set interest rates substantially below
market levels. The new World Trade Organization agreement, moreover, limits
the use of credit policies. Despite these potential obstacles, however, the greatest
challenge facing most developing countries in the use of policy-based finance
remains the absence of the essential factors of good vision and good manage-
ment that explain the success of directed credit policies in Japan and Korea.
Notes
Dimitri Vittas is. Adviser with the Financial Sector Development Department of the World
Bank. Yoon Je Cho is Vice President of the Korea Tax Institute. This article draws on the
findings of a World Bank research project on the "Effectiveness of Credit Policies in East
Asian Countries." These findings were published either as World Bank Discussion Papers
or as Policy Research Working Papers and are cited in the list of references. We are grate-
ful to our many collaborators in this project and to several staff members of the World
Bank for useful insights and comments.
1. The manufacturing sector received 46 percent of total bank loans given in 1970 and
54 percent of the total given in 1980. In contrast, the service sector received only 29
percent in 1970 and 24 percent in 1980.
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